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NOTES
broad discretion in the hands of the trial court to distinguish cer-
tain fact situations has resulted in a greater degree of justice than
could be achieved by the rigid application of a simple rule.
CONCLUSIONS
The rule of Carson v. Beatley, limiting the physician-patient
privilege to conditions related to the particular ailment for which
the patient sought or was being given treatment, is a far too nar-
row interpretation of the statute enacting the physician-patient
privilege. The position of the majority of the courts which hold
all facts to be privileged if discovered by examination is sound
because such information is confidential, and is a normal conse-
quence of an examination which is ordinarily necessary or useful
for treatment.
The Ohio rule is correct, however, in holding that facts
merely "observed" are not privileged. Such facts are not confi-
dential communications, and there is no reason to exclude the
doctor's testimony as to them.
MosEs KRiSLoV
Tax Exemptions to Charities in Ohio
TH. Constitution of Ohio declares that statutes may be enacted
to exempt from taxation "institutions used exclusively for chari-
table purposes."1 Pursuant to this authorization, Ohio General
Code Section 5353 provides that ".... Real and tangible personal
property belonging to institutions used exclusively for charitable
purposes, shall be exempt from taxation."2 It is settled in Ohio
1 OMo CONST. Art. XII, § 2: "... general laws may be passed to exempt burying.
grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship,
institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public property
used exclusively for any public purpose..."
2 For other general exemption statutes see: Omo GEN. CODE § 5350 (burying
grounds); id. § 5349 (school houses, churches, and colleges); id. § 5351 (public
property). See also Omo GEN. CODE § 5328-1a which provides for exemption
of intangible personal property. It should be noted that although the exemption
of property owned by charitable institutions is sanctioned by long usage, some
writers have challenged its validity, principally from the standpoint of tax
economics. See Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious
Organizations in TAX EXEMPTIONs 23 (1939); Stimson, The Exemption of Property
from Taxation in the United States, 18 MN. L. Rv. 411 (1934). For a good his-
torical approach to the problem of tax exemption in Ohio, see Heisel, Exemp-
tion from Taxation of Property Used for Religious, Educational, and Charitable Pur-
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that exemption statutes must be strictly construed in accordance
with the general principle that all property should be uniformly
taxed.' In the light of this policy of strict construction, do the
constitutional and statutory provisions, taken together, mean that
any property held by a charitable institution is exempt, or only
such property as is used exclusively for charitable purposes?
In Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt,4 the plaintiff contended that
because it was admittedly a charitable institution, its property,
for that reason alone, was exempt. The court conceded that the
constitution does authorize the General Assembly to exempt
institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes,5 but held that
Section 5353 as it now stands exempts not the institution but its
property and only if such property is used exclusively for chari-
table purposes.'
Several important requirements must be met before the court
will find that property is "used exclusively for charitable purposes."
poses in Ohio, 3 U. oF GIN. L. REv. 40 (1929). See also Paulsen, Preferment of
Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 144 (1949).
3 Omo CONST. Art. XII § 2: "Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed
by uniform rule according to value." Welfare Federation v. Glander, 146 Ohio
St. 146, 64 N.E.2d 813 (1945); Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
Thatcher, 140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N.E.2d 437 (1942). Note that, as a result of
this rule of strict construction, the meaning of "charity" is more restricted in
the field of taxation than in other fields of law. See RESTATEMENT, TRusis § 368
(1934), where, after a listing of certain specific purposes, it is stated in sub-
section (f) that charitable purposes include "other purposes the accomplish-
ment of which is beneficial to the community." Courts are also liberal in find-
ing that an institution is charitable where it is sued in a tort action. See PROSSER,
TORUS § 108(d) (1941).
4 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N.E.2d 52 (1943). Plaintiff relied on American Issue
Publishing Co. v. Evatt, 137 Ohio St. 264, 266, 28 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1940),
where the court referred to the applicant as "an institution used exclusively for
charitable purposes within the contemplation of the Constitution and the
Statute" and exempted property of the institution used for the printing of
temperance literature distributed at a profit. The Wehrle court dismissed it as a
"border-line" case which must be confined to its facts.
5 But see Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 271, 110 N.E.
924, 929 (1915).
6 There is an exception to this rule. The property of an institution incorporated
in Ohio before 1851 and whose charter grants it exemption may not be taxable
though not used exclusively for charitable purposes. New Orphans' Asylum of
Colored Children v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219, 80 N.E.2d 761
(1948). If certain conditions are present the exemption granted to such institu-
tion will be considered a contractual right irrevocable under the doctrine of
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
See Lattin, A Primer of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 WEST. RES. L. REv. 1,
25 (1949).
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Prior to its amendment in 1912, Article XII, Section 2, of
the Ohio Constitution employed the phrase, "institutions of purely
public charity," in place of the present, "institutions used exclu-
sively for charitable purposes." The former wording was also
embodied in Section 5353 but was correspondingly changed by
re-enactment of that statute in 1923. The rule that property,
in order to be exempt, must be available, in theory at least, to
the use of every member of the public was established under the
older provisions.' And this view still prevails.9 It is difficult to
understand how this interpretation survived the constitutional and
statutory revisions--especially so, in view of the dicta of the
Supreme Court in Benjamin Rose Instiiute v. Myers,"0 where the
court, in discussing the significance of the 1912 amendment, said:
On the other hand, the view in effect is that... the inten-
tion was to grant to the Legislature the permissive power
to extend exemptions to the property of associations which
were not institutions of 'purely public' charity, but which
nevertheless devoted themselves 'exclusively to charitable
purposes,' such as the great fraternal organizations which
provide and maintain homes in Ohio for their aged and
infirm members, their widows and orphan children. Much
of the charitable work of these organizations would have
to be done by the state itself but for them.
This view is also supported by a consideration of the de-
bates of the constitutional convention concerning this
change.'"
7 110 Ohio Laws 77. Section 5353 was also amended in 1913, but the only
change then made was the omission of "purely" from the phrase, "institutions
of purely public charity." 103 Ohio Laws 548.
8 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874), is the leading case.
9 Society of the Precious Blood v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 62,
77 N.E.2d 459 (1948); American Comm. of Rabbinical College v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 148 Ohio St. 654, 76 N.E.2d 719 (1947); Bloch v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 144 Ohio St. 414, 59 N.E.2d 145 (1945); East Cleveland Post, V.F.W.
v. Board of Tax Appeals, 139 Ohio St. 554, 41 N.E.2d 242 (1942).
The rule is not so absolute as to require in every case that the property be
available for actual physical use by the public. See Battelle Memorial Institute
v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 73 N.E.2d 88 (1947), where the court denied exemp-
tion on the ground that part of the work done by plaintiff, a non-profit corpo-
ration which operated a scientific research laboratory, was of a commercial
nature and primarily benefited private industry, but indicated that if its work
had benefited the public generally, the property would have been entitled to
tax exemption.
10 92 Ohio St. 238, 251, 110 N.E. 929, 933 (1915). Note that there are two
Rose Institute cases. See note 5 supra.
11 For a statement to the same effect, see Jones v. Conn, 116 Ohio St. 1, 9,
155 N.E. 791, 793 (1927).
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The question of the proper interpretation of these constitu-
tional and statutory provisions was raised with peculiar conse-
quences in the recent case of Cleveland Bible College v. Board
of Tax Appeals.'2 Two members of the court thought the appli-
cant entitled to tax exemption on the ground that its educational
facilities were open to the public; two others, Judges Taft and
Stewart, concurred in the judgment but contended that Article
XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, and Section 5353 of the
General Code do not require the charity to be "public" in nature
in order to qualify for tax exemption; the remaining members
of the court dissented on the ground that the college's educational
facilities, in fact, were available only to followers of the Christian
religion. The dissent pointed out that the effect of the decision
is to place "in the discard" the earlier cases on the same question. 3
If the Taft-Stewart view should be accepted, much property
now taxed would be removed from the tax duplicate. The result
might well be that the drop in the state's revenue would require
a reapportionment of the tax burden. 4 However, the fact that
five of the seven judges on the present court apparently favor the
"public charity" test for tax exemption supports the prediction
that the Taft-Stewart position will not soon be adopted.
In Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton,5 decided in 1880, the
question before the court was whether a charity which rents out
a part of the building which it owns and occupies may neverthe-
less be given exemption for the entire premises. The Supreme
Court would not permit total exemption, but held only that part
of the plaintiff's building which was being used exclusively 6 for
carrying on its charitable activity entitled to exemption.
This case represented the rule in Ohio until 1945,"7 when the
court reconsidered the problem of partial exemption in Welfare
12 151 Ohio St. 258, 85 N.E.2d 284 (1949).
13Society of the Precious Blood v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 62,
77 N.E.2d 459 (1948); American Comm. of Rabbinical College v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 148 Ohio St. 654, 76 N.E.2d 719 (1947); Bloch v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 144 Ohio St. 414, 59 N.E.2d 145 (1945); East Cleveland Post,
V.F.W. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 139 Ohio St. 554, 41 N.E.2d 242 (1942).
14See remarks of Taft, J. in Cleveland Bible College v. Board of Tax Appeals,
151 Ohio St. 258, 271, 85 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1949).
Is 36 Ohio St. 253 (1880).
16 Note, however, that the words, "purely public charity," were in force at the
time this case was decided.
17 See Note, 159 A.L.R. 685 (1945), where Ohio, by virtue of Cleveland
Library Ass'n v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253 (1880), is listed as being in accord
with the great weight of authority.
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Federation v. Glander."8 The result was a flat refusal to follow
the older decision. It was held that notwithstanding the occu-
pancy by Community Fund agencies of nine floors of an eleven-
story building, of which the Welfare Federation, itself a charity,
was the leasehold owner, the entire property was taxable because
the first two floors were leased to commercial corporations. Judge
Turner, who wrote the majority opinion, concluded that the
Library Ass'n case was incompatible with the policy of strict con-
struction to which the court was committed by its more recent
decisions. More specifically, the court interpreted the phrase
"used exclusively" to mean that the whole property must be used
for charitable purposes."
An indication of the significance of the newly adopted view
is found in the provocative observation made by Judge Williams,
dissenting:
The implications of the pronouncements in the majority
opinion are far-reaching. By virtue thereof a charitable
institution owning a building several stories high might
find that it needed the entire building for its charitable
purposes except the first story, but was unable to rent the
unneeded part for as much as the taxes resulting from
loss of exemption would be on the whole building. There-
fore money would be saved by allowing the first floor to
remain idle. Such a result would be anomalous if not
grotesque."
The Welfare Federation doctrine was followed in Mussio v.
Glander,2" where the court affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals
in its finding that a three-story building was not used exclusively
for charitable purposes because the second floor was, for the most
part, used to provide living quarters for a priest and office space
in connection with the publication of a religious newspaper. It was
admitted that the remainder of the building was exclusively used
for charitable purposes. So, even where the charitable institution
is the sole occupant, if the court finds the use not exclusively
charitable, apparently no exemption whatsoever will be allowed.
18 146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E.2d 813 (1945).
19 The court quoted a statement which the Chief Justice made in an earlier
case: "Obviously 'used exclusively' does not mean 'used in part.'" Pfeiffer v.
Jenkins, 141 Ohio St. 66, 69, 46 N.E.2d 767, 768 (1943).
20 Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 146, 183, 64
N.E.2d 813, 829 (1945). For a well-reasoned recent case from another juris-
diction allowing partial exemption under a statute similar to Ohio's, see
Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 38 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1949).
21 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948).
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A case decided in the January Term of this year, In re Bond
Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School,2 relented somewhat from the
very narrow construction placed upon the word "exclusively" in
the Mussio case. The court on this more recent occasion reversed
the Board's decision disqualifying the applicant for tax exemption
on the ground that residence of a caretaker and his family in the
upper part of a one-and-a-half-story structure rendered the use
of the property not exclusively charitable. In order to reach the
desired result, Judge Taft, writing the opinion of the court, said
that Mussio v. Glander was distinguishable because the use in
that case was not primarily charitable while in the Roselawn case
the contrary was true.
As pointed out above, it is settled that the use of property,
not its ownership, is the test of exemption. The cases support
this principle in its application to the problem raised by commer-
cial property held by charitable organizations.2" The leading case
on the question is Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers.24 The Insti-
tute owned property which it leased for profit. The proceeds,
however, were ultimately used in promotion of its charitable work.
Its claim of exemption of the property from taxation was rejected
in these terms:
Property used to produce income to be expended in
charity is too remote from the ultimate charitable object to
be exempt. If property is allowed to be used as taxed
property, it also is to be taxed. If it competes, in the com-
mon business and occupations of life, with the property of
other owners, it must bear the tax which theirs bears. 5
In view of the important questions of policy involved, it is
interesting to note that a different position has been taken by the
federal courts with respect to corporate income taxation of com-
mercial property held by charitable institutions."
22 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949) (decided under Ohio General Code §
5349 which provides for exemption of "houses used exclusively for public
worship.")
2 3 New Orphans' Asylum of Colored Children v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150
Ohio St. 219, 80 N.E.2d 761 (1948); Burns v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 198, 64
N.E.2d 678 (1945); Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Workers' Society v.
Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 185, 42 N.E.2d 900 (1942); Benjamin Rose Institute v.
Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924 (1915). American Issue Publishing Co.
v. Evatt, 137 Ohio St. 264, 28 N.E.2d 613 (1940), represents a possible ex-
ception. See note 4 supra.
24 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924 (1915).
25 Id. at 265, 110 N.E. at 927 (1915) quoting Academy of Richmond County v.
Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 164, 7 S.E. 633, 635 (1887).
26 INT. REV. CODE § 101(6) is the applicable statute. For discussion of cases see
6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATON § 34.14 et seq. (1948 rev.).
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The Ohio Supreme Court has recently ruled in Beerman
Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals,27 that apartment houses
owned by a non-profit corporation and occupied by disabled war
veterans' families who pay rents fixed well below the market value
were properly taxed. The court admitted that no element of pri-
vate gain appeared in the facts. It denied the exemption largely
on the ground that each and every occupant was required to
pay for accommodations. 8 Several other decisions support the
rule that a use is not exclusively charitable unless some service is
rendered free to those unable to pay.2" So a building used as a
dormitory for purses who pay low rents was held taxable;"0 and a
hospital insurance association was held to be actually engaged in
a "business" mainly because it furnished no services to the needy
without payment." On the other hand, a nurses' dormitory was
held exempt where no charge for either room or board was
made;32 and the Board of Tax Appeals recently granted exemp-
tion to a hospital which estimated that four and one-half per
cent of its patients were "charity" cases. 3
The position of the court on the general question of what
constitutes an operation for profit is not entirely clear unless the
broad language used in Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Au-
thority v. Evatt34 may be accepted as formulating a rule not
limited to the facts of that case:
Property comprising the project here in question is
purely a commercial operation wherein a sufficient rental
is charged not only to pay maintenance and repairs but to
provide a reserve fund to pay the interest and retire the
bonds. As has been pointed out $100,000 of the bonds have
been retired before maturity during 1942.
This project is being operated for profit and the profit
27 152 Ohio St. 179, 87 N.E.2d 474 (1949).
28 The opinion indicates that the court, in reaching its decision, also considered
plaintiff's failure to show that disabled veterans are proper objects of charity
29 For a good discussion of this question, see Fredericka Home for the Aged v
San Diego County, 206 P.2d 931 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (exemption allowed)
30 Cleveland Branch of Guild of St. Barnabas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150
Ohio St. 484, 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948).
31 Hospital Service Ass'n of Toledo v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179, 57 N.E.2d 928
(1944).
32 Aultman Hospital Ass'n v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 114, 42 N.E.2d 646 (1942).
33 Application of Cleveland Memorial Medical Foundation, 54 Ohio L. Abs.
88, 83 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio B.T.A. 1948).
34 143 Ohio St. 268, 55 N.E.2d 122 (1944).
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is being used to pay the principal and interest on the
outstanding bonds."
From the accountant's point of view, perhaps, the court is
correct. A business which has enough money left after interest
payments to reduce its long-term indebtedness may be said to be
operating at a profit, but so technical an argument would seem
likely to discourage any effort by an institution to become self-
supporting through fear of losing its exempt status.
36
The cases make it clear that there can be no exclusively
charitable use if the property was not yet in actual use during the
time for which exemption is claimed. Mere preparations made
in anticipation of such use are not enough. An institution hold-
ing a vacant lot on which it intends to build a school as soon as
sufficient funds are raised fails the test. 7 Similarly, the funds of
an endowment or trust are not exempt from the personal property
tax prior to the time charity is actually dispensed by the trustees.3"
The fact that construction of a home for aged women is delayed
by material shortages caused by war does not take the case outside
the rule that the property must be presently used for charitable
purposes. 9 That any stronger evidence could be found to show
that this rule is subject to few, if any, exceptions seems doubtful. °
35 Id. at 281, 55 N.E.2d at 128 (1944). The Authority's chief contention was
that its property was exempt under Ohio General Code § 5351 as public prop-
erty used exclusively for a public purpose. The court held that the project had
no characteristics of public property and went on to consider the claim of
exemption under § 5353. But cf. Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill.
356, 19 N.E.2d 193 (1939), where it was held that its object of slum clearance
brought the Authority within the exempting statute as a public charity.
36 See Note, Tax Status of Municipally Owned Transit System, 1 WST. REs. L. REv.
84 (1949). In Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942), (suit
to recover damages for tortious injury), the court held that a church does not
lose its charitable character by selling small religious articles and using any
difference between cost and selling price for religious purposes.
37 Ursuline Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 141 Ohio St. 563, 49 N.E.2d
674 (1943).
38 Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt, 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N.E.2d 52 (1943); Jones
v. Conn, 116 Ohio St. 1, 155 N.E. 791 (1927).
39 In reJudson Palmer Home, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 267, 16 Ohio Supp. (63 N.E.2d)
166 (Ohio B.T.A. 1945).
40 In Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St.
564, 80 N.E.2d 156 (1948), the court, by a four to three margin, held that a
vacant lot on which the applicant intended to build a schoolhouse was exempt.
The majority held Ohio General Code § 4835-16 ("Real and personal property
vested in any board of education shall be exempt from taxation") decisive. The
dissenting judges, on the other hand, thought the words of the statute limited
by Article XII, § 2 of the constitution and that consequently only property
presently in use could be exempted.
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It is obvious from the foregoing survey that the Supreme Court
of Ohio applies the rule of strict construction to Section 5353 with
a vengeance. In so doing its chief concern, apparently, is the
danger of overburdening the general taxpaying community-a
danger which it feels would necessarily be realized by adoption,
on its part, of a more liberal attitude toward awarding exemp-
tions. A statement by the Board of Tax Appeals quoted by the
court in the Beerman case,4' unmistakably reflects this fear:
Every property removed from the tax duplicate increases
the tax burden on other property. If applicant desires to
dispense a charity it ought to do so without forced con-
tribution from other taxpayers."
Although the policy of equal distribution of the tax burden
requires that all exemptions be strictly controlled, it is also in
the public interest that the state give proper recognition to the
value of the work done by private charitable organizations. From
an examination of the cases, it seems fair to say that the court
has at times been over-zealous in its efforts to avoid "forced con-
tribution from other taxpayers."
LAD J. ROTH
41 Beerman Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 152 Ohio St. 179, 87
N.E.2d 474 (1949).
42 Id. at 181, 87 N.E.2d at 475 (1949). Taken literally, this statement suggests a
rule of thumb-applicable to all tax exemption cases-which would, in a
simple fashion, solve all the existing problems in this field.
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